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CObjective: To call attention to the influence of the number of birth-
cohorts used in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) models on incremen-
tal cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) under differential discounting.
Methods: The consequences of increasing the number of birth-cohorts
are demonstrated using a CEA of cervical cancer prevention as an ex-
ample. The cost-effectiveness of vaccinating 12-year-old girls against
the human papillomavirus is estimated with the MISCAN microsimu-
lation screening analysismodel for 1, 10, 20, and 30 birth-cohorts. Costs
and health effects are discounted with equal rates of 4% and alterna-
tively with differential rates of 4% and 1.5% respectively. The effects of
increasing the number of cohorts are shown by comparing the ICERs
under equal and differential discounting. Results: The ICER decreases
as the number of cohorts increases under differential discounting, but
not under equal discounting. Conclusions: The variation of ICERswith O
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doi:10.1016/j.jval.2010.09.009he number of cohorts under differential discounting prompts ques-
ions regarding the appropriate specification of CEA models and inter-
retation of their results. In particular, it raises concerns that arbitrary
ariation in study specification leads to arbitrary variation in results.
uch variations could lead to erroneous policy decisions. These find-
ngs are relevant to CEA guidance authorities, CEA practitioners, and
ecision makers. Our results do not imply a problem with differential
iscounting per se, yet they highlight the need for practical guidance
or its use.
eywords: cohort models, cost-effectiveness analysis, differential
iscounting, population models, study comparability.
opyright © 2011, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Debate over differential discounting
Discounting is used in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to ad-
just future costs and health effects to their present values and
volumes. This adjustment is to account for the positive time
preference for goods, including health [1]. While discounting in
general is widely accepted in CEA and other forms of economic
analysis [2], whether discount rates for costs and effects should
be equal has been debated extensively within health economics
[2–9]. Equal discount rates for costs and effects are most com-
monly used [10]. Equal discounting is supported by a number of
arguments, the most important of which are Weinstein and
Stason’s [4] consistency thesis, Keeler and Cretin’s [3] postpon-
ing paradox, and the tradability of health argument [11]. Differ-
ential discounting is being advocated more frequently, whereby
health effects are discounted at a different (typically lower) rate
than costs [2,6,7,9,12]. Previous arguments for differential dis-
* Address correspondence to: James O’Mahony, MA, Department o
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1098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2011, Internation
Published by Elsevier Inc.counting were primarily based on the anticipation of an in-
creasing societal value of health as income grows [7,12,13]. Re-
cent work has shown, more generally, that differential dis-
counting is justified if the cost-effectiveness threshold is
anticipated to change, where the threshold may be defined with
reference to either the consumption value of health or the cost-
effectiveness of displaced interventions at the margin in the
context of fixed health care budgets [14].
Currently, only a small number of CEA authorities recommend
differential discounting [15]. TheDutchHealth Care Insurance Board
(College voor Zorgverzekeringen [CVZ]) revised its recommended
rates in 2006, from equal rates of 4% to differential rates of 4% and
1.5% for costs and health effects respectively [12,16]. Belgium also
recently adopted differential discounting at rates of 3% and 1.5% for
costs and effects respectively [17]. The National Institute for Health
ndClinical Excellence (NICE) in EnglandandWales useddifferential
iscounting from its inceptionwith ratesof 6%and1.5% for costs and
ffects respectively, but reverted to equal discounting at 3.5% in 2004
7,18].
lic Health, Erasmus University Medical Centre, PO Box 2040, 3000
ciety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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Modeling is widely used in cost-effectiveness analysis of health-
care interventions [19]. Modeling can be used both to extrapolate
outcomes beyond trial follow-upperiods and to simulate interven-
tions that have not or cannot be assessed using controlled trials
[1,20,21]. CEAmodels most commonly only simulate one cohort of
individuals [22]. Amultiple-cohort modeling approach ismore ap-
propriate in some cases, such as where risk factors change over
time, leading to cohort effects; where the effects of a disease are
dynamic, such as in infectious diseases; or where both prevalent
and incident cohorts need to be considered [22–25].
Decision making using CEA relies on comparisons between
analyses to determine which interventions are cost-effective. In
theory, interventions can be ranked by their incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios (ICERs) and accepted in order of cost-effec-
tiveness until the budget constraint is reached [26]. In practice,
it is more typical to accept interventions with ICERs below a
given threshold as cost-effective [4]. Both decision rules com-
pare interventions’ ICERs, either directly in the case of the rank-
ing rule, or indirectly through the threshold.
Overview
Wecompare the results of single-cohort andmultiple-cohort CEAs
of the same intervention to quantify the consequences of alterna-
tive numbers of cohorts (henceforth, CEA specification) under dif-
ferential discounting.We show, using a CEA of vaccination against
the human papillomavirus (HPV) as an illustrative example, that
the ICER falls as more cohorts are included in the analysis under
differential discounting, but remains constant under equal dis-
counting. Recent work by Hoyle and Anderson [22] also noted that
increasing the number of cohorts reduces ICERs under differential
discounting. We address this particular issue in greater depth and
consider its significance for CEA practice and health care decision
making. In this article, we take no normative stance for or
against differential discounting; however, we consider its con-
sequences from the perspective of equal discounting being the
policy norm in most countries to date. Most previous studies of
differential discounting have addressed its theoretical merits;
our study adds to the literature by explicitly considering the
practical consequences of differential discounting for decision
making using CEA.
Methods
We examined how an intervention’s ICER changes as the number
of cohorts modeled increases using the example of the MISCAN
Fig. 1 – Comparison of discounting in a single cohort and amicrosimulationmodel of cervical screening and HPV vaccinationin The Netherlands employed in a recently published CEA [27].
Further details of the model specification and assumptions can be
found in that publication. The model simulates the individual life
histories of one or more birth-year cohorts of women, who, in the
absence of either screening or vaccination, acquire aHPV infection
at a certain rate; some develop a pre-invasive lesion and/or cancer
and a proportion die from the disease. This results in an age and
calendar time-specific output of disease incidence and mortality.
The simulation is repeated, now including screening, both with
and without vaccination. Screening is simulated as the current
Dutch program: seven screens between the ages of 30 and 60 at
5-year intervals. Vaccination is administered at age 12. These in-
terventions change some of the life histories, either by prevent-
ing disease or detecting and treating it earlier, resulting in im-
proved health states, longer life, and reduced treatment costs.
Treatment costs and quality of life adjustments are then ap-
plied to these consequences to estimate the intervention’s
treatment cost savings and quality-adjusted life year (QALY)
gains. The difference between the total net discounted costs
and health effects of screening alone and screening and vacci-
nation combined is used to calculate the incremental cost-
effectiveness of HPV vaccination.
A number of additional simplifying assumptions aremade in the
present study: the undiscounted costs and effects are the same for
every cohort; no booster vaccination is required; and there are no
start-up or fixed costs. A large number of women (1 billion) are sim-
ulated in each model to minimize differences due to random error.
Each cohort in themulti-cohortmodels contains anequal proportion
of the total number of individuals.
The ICER of HPV vaccination from a single-cohort analysis is
compared to ICERs from analyses with 10, 20, and 30 cohorts. The
analyses differ only in the number of cohorts used; all else is held
constant. Each cohort is defined by its birth year and each receives
the vaccination 1 year after the preceding cohort. Figure 1 depicts
a single-cohort and a 10-cohort model. Costs and effects are dis-
counted by 4%and 1.5% respectively, and also by a common rate of
4%. Costs and effects are discounted to the year the first cohort is
vaccinated.
Results
Table 1 presents the results of the single and multi-cohort models
under equal and differential discounting. The table reports the dis-
counted incremental costs and effects and the corresponding ICERs
in each of themodels and discount rate assumptions. The table also
reports the ICERs of themulti-cohort models as a percentage of that
of the single-cohort model.
lti-cohort model with 10 cohorts (cohorts 4–9 not shown).muThe ICERs are significantly lower under differential discounting
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440 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 4 3 8 – 4 4 2compared to equal discounting. This is due to the lower discounting
of health effects; consequently, the discounted effects are larger
while the discounted costs remain the same, resulting in lower ICERs.
The important result, however, is the variation in ICERs be-
tweenmodels with different numbers of cohorts. The ICERs do not
vary significantly with the number of cohorts under equal dis-
counting; the small differences in costs and effects are due to
random variation in the simulation model. Conversely, with dif-
ferential discounting, the ICERs are considerably lower in the
multi-cohort models and fall as the numbers of cohorts increase.
Themagnitude of the differences is large: the 10-cohortmodel has
an ICER that is approximately 90% of the single-cohort model’s
ratio; the 30-cohort model has an ICER that is approximately 74%
of the single-cohort model’s ratio.
Figure 2 (panel A) shows the annual discount factors for the cur-
rent Dutch discount rates for cost and effects of 4% and 1.5% respec-
tively, where t  1 is the discount year. The grey line in panel B
indicates the ratios of ICERs of the nth future cohort relative to the
first cohort at thediscount year,where each cohort is n 1 year from
the discount year, and undiscounted costs and effects are equal for
all cohorts. This line is also the ratio of the discount factors shown in
panel A. The black line in panel B represents the ratio of ICERs of a
multi-cohort model with n cohorts relative to a model of a single
cohort at the discount year, with the points labeled for models with
n 10, 20, and 30 cohorts.
Discussion
Explanation
Our results are easily explained by considering the differences
between equal and differential discounting. Under equal dis-
counting, varying the length of time between the discount year
and the intervention (and its effects) does not influence the ICER;
although the present value of costs and effects change, they vary
proportionately. It is with this respect that Lipscomb et al. [28]
escribed CEA as “time neutral” under equal discounting; how-
ver, CEA is not “time neutral” under differential discounting. In-
reasing the length of time between the intervention and the dis-
ount year causes the present value of effects to fall less than
roportionally to the reduction in the present value of costs, re-
ulting in a lower ICER. Consequently, both shifting a single co-
ort to a later period relative to the discount year and adding
ater cohorts to a CEA will not cause the ICER to fall under equal
iscounting, but will under differential discounting. Our analy-
is demonstrates the second of these two effects.
Wehave highlighted the consequences of a lower discount rate
n health effects, which is appropriate if the threshold is growing,
s the discount differential should approximate the annual
Table 1 – Incremental costs, incremental health effects, an
current screening program in The Netherlands*.
Equal discount rates
Single
cohort
10
cohorts co
Incremental costs, €M 324,423 273,662 22
Incremental effects, QALYs (000s) 3190 2690
ICER, €/QALY (4 s.f.) 101,700 101,700 10
Ratio of ICERs,
multiple/single cohort
Reference 100% 1
HPV, human papillomavirus; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ra
* A comparison of a single cohort andmultiple cohortmodels with 10
differential discounting of 4% and 1.5% for costs and effects respecrowth rate of the threshold [14]. However, the threshold may notnecessarily grow over time, even with an expanding health care
budget, but may be static or fall [29]. A falling threshold would
imply a larger discount rate for health than costs [30], resulting in
increasing ICERs as more cohorts are included.
Relevance for practice and policy
The analysis reveals that the number of cohorts used in CEA can
influence ICERs. To understand the practical significance of this
result we have to consider current CEA practice. The current un-
derstanding of appropriate CEA model specification most likely
does not account for the influence of varying numbers of cohorts.
Consequently, without clear guidance on the matter, CEA prac-
titioners are likely to continue specifying studies with the min-
imum number of cohorts they consider necessary. Interven-
tions differ in their modeling requirements, and this will
continue to result in the variety of models’ specifications evi-
dent in reviews of modeling methodologies [24,31,32].
The concern is that arbitrary variation in CEA specifications
leads to results which, in part, vary arbitrarily too. A related con-
cern is that CEAsmay be deliberately specifiedwith large numbers
of cohorts or large lags between the discount year and the start of
the intervention to achieve low ICERs. We have focused on the
issue of multiple cohorts rather than unnecessarily long lags be-
tween the discount year and implementation because the latter is
more easily recognized as inappropriate manipulation of the CEA.
Such arbitrary or strategically chosen variations can compromise
comparability between studies. As a result, CEAs may not be ade-
quately reflecting the policy choices they are intended to inform.
These concerns are compounded by the probable lack of awareness
among decision makers of the influence of CEA specifications on
results. Decision makers may well continue comparing ICERs di-
rectly,without taking the differentmodel specifications into account
or checking whether they adequately reflect the relevant policy
choice. Such direct comparisons could lead to incorrect policy
choices, whereby an intervention is deemed cost-effective as it has a
lower ICER than the threshold or an alternative intervention, but
where this result is due to arbitrarily or strategically chosen differ-
ences in the CEA specification, rather than the intervention’s actual
implementation and inherent characteristics.
Naturally, these concerns lead to a consideration of how to
avoid or reduce arbitrary variations between studies. For instance,
one could prescribe a base-case specification that imposes a stan-
dard number of cohorts for all CEAs. However, given the wide
variation of the characteristics and implementation of interven-
tions, a standardized CEA specificationmay not adequately reflect
these differences and, thus, result in meaningless comparisons.
Therefore, if standardization is not possible, it is not yet clear
how or if CEA practice can be adapted to avoid arbitrary varia-
tion between studies. Consequently, CEAs should be evaluated
R of adding vaccination against the HPV 16/18 to the
& 4% Differential discount rates: 4% & 1.5%
30
cohorts
Single
cohort
10
cohorts
20
cohorts
30
cohorts
194,470 324,423 273,662 229,268 194,470
1912 10839 10146 9444 8809
101,700 29,900 27,000 24,300 22,100
100% Reference 90% 81% 74%
ALY, quality-adjusted life year.
nd 30 cohorts under equal discounting of 4% for costs and effects and
.d ICE
: 4%
20
horts
9,268
2254
1,700
00%
tio; Q
, 20, aon an informed, case-by-case basis. Accordingly, it is appropri-
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441V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 4 3 8 – 4 4 2ate to demand a clear justification of the CEA specification from
the CEA practitioner.
These questions of how to specify and interpret CEAs relate to
doubts about the appropriateness of current CEA decision rules. A
number of authors have indicated that ICERs are inappropriate for
determining the optimal timing of interventions [2,33–35]. Coun-
ter-intuitive results arise under both equal and differential dis-
counting. For example, decision makers choosing the period of
implementation with the lowest ICER will prefer to (infinitely)
postpone implementation under differential discounting (the
postponing paradox) [3], whereas, unrealistically, they should be
indifferent between immediate implementation or infinite post-
ponement under equal discounting. While both these results are
difficult to defend, it is the postponing paradox that has generated
debate in the literature. The postponing paradox has been dis-
missed as irrelevant to actual policy choices [6]. Indeed, when us-
ing a threshold-based decision rule, any postponement will not be
Fig. 2 – (A) Annual discount factors over time under
discount rates of 4% and 1.5% for costs and effects
respectively; (B) ratio of ICERs of the nth single cohort
relative to the 1st single cohort at the discount year and
the ratio of ICERs of a multi cohort model with n cohorts
relative to the 1st single cohort under simplifying
assumptions.infinite, but until the ICER falls below the threshold.While the relevance of the postponing paradox to actual policy
choices is disputed, our results show that interventions modeled
with a greater proportion of their implementation in the future
have the advantage of lower ICERs. In this context, Cohen’s [34]
uestioning of the appropriateness of current decision rules to
ealth care services that exhaust their budgets annually without
aving a surplus may be relevant. He commented that using CEA
o compare interventions over multiple periods implies that co-
orts compete for resources that are fungible across periods,
hereas it might be more appropriate to use CEA to compare
ohorts competing for resources within periods. Consequently,
he debate over differential discounting and the implications
or comparisons between studies may prompt a broader recon-
ideration of policy decision rules and the economic evaluation
f health care.
Recommendations for CEA practice
The aim of this study is to promote awareness of the effects of
alternative CEA specifications under differential discounting
among CEA practitioners and decision makers. We hope CEA ad-
visory bodies will recognize the significance of the findings pre-
sented here and reflect it in their guidance, for example: 1) require
a justification of theCEA’s specification; and 2) provide guidance to
decision makers regarding the influence of the number of cohorts
included. Such clarity is important, as confusion regarding the
validity of comparisons between analyses can only serve to dam-
age CEA’s credibility with decision makers and others. Note that
the issues raised in this article should not be interpreted as
arguments against differential discounting; rather they should
be understood as a call for greater understanding of its practical
implications. CEA authorities considering adopting differential
discounting should consider these practical implications in ad-
dition to the theoretical arguments. CEA practitioners and de-
cision makers in countries already using differential discount-
ing would benefit from recognizing its implications to ensure
best practice and correct policy choices.
Limitations and further research
We emphasize that this article does not provide a complete dis-
cussion of the methodological implications of differential dis-
counting. Such a discussionwould require a detailed review of the
underlying theoretical basis for comparing interventions across
different time periods with a changing threshold, which is beyond
the scope of this study. This remains an important area for future
research and debate; see Claxton et al. [14] for further discussion.
owever, this study does call attention to some important practi-
al issues related to differential discounting that both analysts and
olicy makers need to be aware of when using and comparing the
esults of cost-effectiveness analyses in practice.
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